Preventive moves and urgent advisories dominated the day. CISA disclosed critical flaws across widely used industrial automation products, while Microsoft shipped changes to curb credential theft in Windows and outlined a broadened approach to identity defense. In parallel, details shared by Schneier described a serious breach at F5 that reached its build environment and source code, heightening supply‑chain risk for BIG‑IP users.
Platform defenses tighten
A Windows security change reported by BleepingComputer disables File Explorer’s preview pane for files from the Internet Zone or marked with the Mark of the Web, closing a path where selecting a malicious download could leak NTLM hashes with no extra user action. In a separate post, Microsoft detailed expanded Identity Threat Detection and Response, unifying signals across on‑prem and multiple cloud identity providers and shifting to an identity‑centric model that correlates accounts, devices, and sessions for faster investigations. Together, the changes reduce exposure to credential theft and strengthen visibility across hybrid environments.
Securing AI agents in production also featured prominently. Google Cloud outlined a layered defense for agent workflows—from pre‑inference input filtering with Model Armor and least‑privilege execution in sandboxes to network isolation and detailed observability—demonstrating how controls block prompt injection, exfiltration, and context poisoning without breaking intended functionality. The guidance emphasizes auditable logs and governance as agent use scales.
Industrial controls: critical flaws and mitigations
Beyond the headline advisory on AutomationDirect’s Productivity Suite and PLC firmware, which includes issues up to CVSS 10.0 and CVSS v4 9.3 with risks from arbitrary code execution to full project control, operators face additional exposures in energy and tank‑gauge systems. In a separate notice, CISA warned that ASKI Energy ALS‑Mini‑S4/S8 controllers have a CVSS 10.0 unauthenticated access flaw (CVE‑2025‑9574). The devices are end‑of‑life with no planned patch, placing the burden on network isolation, strict access controls, and monitoring.
The latest CISA bulletin on Veeder‑Root’s TLS4B Automatic Tank Gauge details an authenticated SOAP command injection (CVE‑2025‑58428) fixed in Version 11.A and an upcoming patch for a time‑handling integer overflow (CVE‑2025‑55067) that could lock out admin access and disrupt logging at the 2038 epoch rollover. For critical manufacturing and energy deployments, prompt upgrades where available and disciplined segmentation remain the primary risk‑reduction steps. Why it matters: the combination of remote exploitation paths and operational impact spans safety, availability, and regulatory obligations across globally deployed ICS estates.
Cloud moves to streamline secure connectivity and migration
Google Cloud made Cross‑Site Interconnect generally available, delivering managed Layer‑2 adjacencies over its backbone with a 99.95% SLA, MACsec support, and consumption‑based bandwidth to simplify resilient, high‑throughput links between data centers, colocation, and regions. Azure likewise announced GA for cloud‑to‑cloud migration from AWS S3 to Azure Blob via Storage Mover, enabling parallel, agentless transfers with metadata preservation, incremental syncs, RBAC integration, and full telemetry. These services shift complexity from bespoke circuits and scripts to managed offerings with clearer controls, aiding governance and accelerating data‑driven projects.
Active exploitation and evolving threats
Threat actors are actively exploiting a critical RCE in Motex’s Lanscope Endpoint Manager clients (CVE‑2025‑61932), with fixes available across multiple client releases; the issue has been added to the KEV catalog and requires prompt client updates, per coverage by BleepingComputer. Meanwhile, Check Point reports LockBit’s resurgence with new 5.0 activity across Windows, Linux, and ESXi environments and roughly a dozen recent victims, underscoring the need for layered endpoint controls, segmentation, and rehearsed response.
Beyond single campaigns, Unit 42 mapped a decentralized smishing operation attributed to the Smishing Triad, cataloging more than 194,000 FQDNs since early 2024 with rapid domain churn and brand‑mimicking lures aimed at credentials and payment data. Talos incident response trends for Q3 highlight a surge in exploitation of public‑facing apps—particularly unauthenticated SharePoint flaws—frequent ToolShell activity, and ransomware follow‑ons when segmentation is weak. Why it matters: defenders face compressed timelines between disclosure and mass exploitation, making rapid patching and strong network boundaries decisive.