All news with #cloud account compromise tag

⚠️ Amazon GuardDuty and AWS automated monitoring identified a coordinated crypto‑mining campaign beginning November 2, 2025, that used compromised IAM credentials to deploy miners on Amazon EC2 and Amazon ECS. Attackers enumerated quotas and permissions, launched large EC2 fleets and ECS Fargate tasks from a malicious Docker Hub image, and used persistence techniques such as disabling API termination and creating public Lambda URLs. GuardDuty Extended Threat Detection correlated signals to surface critical attack sequences and AWS provides IoCs and mitigation guidance including strong identity controls, CloudTrail logging, Runtime Monitoring, and remediation playbooks.

🔒 Amazon Threat Intelligence has attributed with high confidence a years‑long campaign to Russia’s GRU, noting a shift in 2025 from exploiting software flaws to compromising misconfigured customer network edge devices. The actor has targeted enterprise routers, VPN concentrators, network management appliances and cloud-hosted edge instances, including some hosted on AWS, to gain initial access. This tactic supports credential harvesting, replay attacks and lateral movement while reducing attacker exposure and resource expenditure.

🔒 Recent research from the Wiz Customer Incident Response Team shows attackers are using exposed GitHub Personal Access Tokens (PATs) to retrieve GitHub Action Secrets and pivot into cloud environments. A read-level PAT can leverage GitHub’s API code search to locate secret references like "${{ secrets.SECRET_NAME }}" — and because those search API calls are not logged, discovery is stealthy. Once obtained, cloud provider credentials let attackers spin up resources, exfiltrate data, install malware, or persist while often evading detection. Organizations should treat PATs as privileged credentials: enforce expiration and rotation, remove cloud secrets from workflows, apply least privilege, and improve monitoring and developer training.

🔒 Salesforce says it revoked active access and refresh tokens tied to Gainsight-published applications after detecting unusual activity that may have enabled unauthorized access to some customers' CRM data. The company says the issue stems from the app's external connection rather than a vulnerability in Salesforce itself and temporarily removed those apps from the AppExchange. Affected customers have been notified and can contact Salesforce Help for assistance.

🔒 Phishing is moving beyond email to platforms like LinkedIn, where direct messages sidestep traditional email defenses and evade many web-based controls. Attackers exploit account takeovers, weak MFA adoption, and AI-driven outreach to scale targeted campaigns against executives and cloud identity services. Because LinkedIn messages are accessed on corporate devices but outside email channels, organizations often rely on user reporting and URL blocking—measures that are slow and ineffective. Vendor Push Security recommends browser-level protections that analyze page code and behavior in real time to block in-browser phishing and SSO-based compromises.

🔐 Identity compromise is driving large-scale AWS abuse, with attackers leveraging stolen access keys to test accounts and weaponize Amazon SES for Business Email Compromise and invoice fraud. FortiGuard Labs attributes the reconnaissance layer to a campaign named TruffleNet that uses TruffleHog and automated AWS CLI/Boto3 requests to validate credentials and probe SES quotas. Fortinet recommends continuous monitoring, least-privilege access, MFA, and integrated detection via FortiCNAPP and related controls to detect and block these activities.

🔒Researchers detail a threat cluster called Jingle Thief that leverages phishing and smishing to harvest credentials and compromise cloud environments of retailers and consumer services to issue unauthorized gift cards. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 links the activity to financially motivated actors and notes coordinated campaigns in April-May 2025. The attackers favor identity misuse over malware, persistently mapping tenants, abusing Microsoft 365 services, and minimizing logs to sustain large-scale fraud.

🔍Unit 42 details the Jingle Thief campaign, a Morocco‑based, financially motivated operation that uses phishing and smishing to harvest Microsoft 365 credentials and abuse cloud services to commit large‑scale gift card fraud. The actors maintain prolonged, stealthy access for reconnaissance across SharePoint, OneDrive and Exchange, and rely on internal phishing, inbox rules and rogue device enrollment in Entra ID to persist and issue unauthorized cards. The report (cluster CL‑CRI‑1032) links the activity to Atlas Lion/STORM‑0539 and emphasizes identity‑centric detections and mitigations.

🔍 Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a financially motivated actor tracked as Storm-2657 conducting targeted 'payroll pirate' intrusions against US universities to divert salary payments. The actor used realistic phishing and adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) links to harvest credentials and MFA codes, gained access to Exchange Online, abused SSO to reach Workday profiles, and created inbox rules to hide payroll notifications. Microsoft recommends adopting phishing-resistant, passwordless MFA and provides detections and remediation guidance.

🔒 SonicWall has confirmed that an unauthorized actor accessed firewall configuration backup files stored in its cloud backup service for customers. The files include encrypted credentials and device configuration data; while encryption remains in place, SonicWall warned that possession of these backups could increase the risk of targeted attacks. The vendor says access was achieved via brute-force attacks and that suspicious activity was first detected in early September 2025. Working with Mandiant, SonicWall has issued remediation tools, published impacted device lists in the MySonicWall portal, and is notifying affected partners and customers.

🔒 Researchers report the 'Crimson Collective' has been targeting long-term AWS credentials and IAM accounts to steal data and extort companies. Using open-source tools like TruffleHog, the attackers locate exposed AWS keys, create new IAM users and access keys, then escalate privileges by attaching AdministratorAccess. They snapshot RDS and EBS volumes, export data to S3, and send extortion notices via AWS SES. Rapid7 urges organisations to audit keys, enforce least privilege, and scan for exposed secrets.

🛡️ Darktrace researchers uncovered a ShadowV2 campaign that leverages exposed Docker APIs on AWS EC2 to provision containers and run a Go-based remote access trojan, converting misconfigured cloud containers into distributed DDoS nodes. The attackers create containers on victim hosts rather than importing malicious images, likely to reduce forensic traces, and use the Python Docker SDK to interact with exposed daemons. ShadowV2 operators employ advanced techniques including HTTP/2 rapid reset and Cloudflare evasion, and the platform includes APIs, a Tailwind/FastAPI UI and operator logins that turn botnet control into a commercialized DDoS-as-a-Service offering.

🔒 SonicWall warned that brute-force attacks against its firewall API used for cloud backups may have exposed preference files stored in customers' MySonicWall.com portals. The vendor has disabled the cloud backup capability and is urging admins to restrict or disable SSLVPN and Web/SSH management over the WAN, then reset passwords, keys, and secrets. Less than 5% of the install base had backups in the cloud, but that could still affect thousands of organizations. SonicWall has provided remediation guidance and will notify customers if their accounts show impacted serial numbers.

🔒 Microsoft Threat Intelligence details a campaign by Storm-0501 that exfiltrated data from a large enterprise’s Azure environment, then deleted backups and encrypted remaining resources to block recovery. The actor abused Entra Connect synchronization, elevated to Global Administrator, and used Azure Owner privileges to steal storage keys and transfer blobs via AzCopy. Microsoft recommends enabling blob backups, least privilege, logging, and Azure Backup to mitigate these cloud-native ransomware tactics.

🔒 Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports that financially motivated actor Storm-0501 has shifted from on‑premises endpoint encryption toward cloud‑native ransomware tactics emphasizing rapid data exfiltration, destruction of backups, and extortion. The actor leverages compromised Entra Connect sync accounts, DCSync, and hybrid‑joined devices to escalate to Global Administrator and gain full Azure control. In cloud environments they abuse Azure operations (listing storage keys, AzCopy exfiltration, snapshot and resource deletions) and create malicious federated domains for persistence and impersonation. Microsoft recommends hardening sync configurations, enforcing phishing‑resistant MFA, enabling Defender for Cloud and storage protections, and applying least‑privilege access controls.

🔒 GTIG warns of a widespread data-theft campaign by UNC6395 that abused compromised OAuth tokens for the Salesloft Drift connected app to export data from multiple Salesforce customer instances between Aug. 8 and Aug. 18, 2025. The actor executed SOQL queries against objects including Accounts, Cases, Users, and Opportunities to harvest credentials and secrets—observed items include AWS access keys, Snowflake tokens, and passwords. Salesloft and Salesforce revoked tokens and removed the Drift app from the AppExchange; impacted organizations should search for exposed secrets, rotate credentials, review Event Monitoring logs, and tighten connected-app scopes and IP restrictions.

🚨 The Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) reported on August 24 that it is investigating a cyber incident involving unauthorized access to specific systems. Most core services, including Local Bus, Metro Subway, Light Rail, MARC and Commuter Bus, remain on schedule, but some functions are disrupted. Affected services include Mobility Paratransit new bookings and rescheduling, MTA real-time updates and call center support, and Baltimore Metro elevator phones, and the agency is working with the Maryland Department of Information Technology, third-party cybersecurity experts and law enforcement to investigate and remediate the issue.

🛡️ CrowdStrike warns that China-linked groups Murky Panda, Genesis Panda, and Glacial Panda have intensified cloud and telecommunications espionage, abusing trusted cloud relationships and internet-facing appliances to gain access. The actors exploit N-day and zero-day flaws, deploy web shells, and steal cloud credentials to establish persistence with tools such as CloudedHope. Targets include government, technology, financial, and telecom sectors, with operations tailored to covert intelligence collection and long-term access.