All news with #muddywater tag
Mon, December 8, 2025
MuddyWater Deploys UDPGangster Backdoor in Attacks
🔒 The Iranian-linked group MuddyWater has been observed deploying a new UDP-based backdoor called UDPGangster, using UDP channels for command-and-control, data exfiltration, and remote command execution. Fortinet FortiGuard Labs says the campaign targeted users in Turkey, Israel, and Azerbaijan via spear-phishing messages that deliver macro-enabled Word documents (e.g., "seminer.doc" inside "seminer.zip") and display a Hebrew-language decoy image. The embedded VBA macro decodes Base64 content into C:\Users\Public\ui.txt and launches it via CreateProcessA; the payload establishes registry persistence and runs multiple anti-analysis checks before communicating over UDP to 157.20.182[.]75:1269 to exfiltrate data, run commands with "cmd.exe", transfer files, and deploy additional payloads.
Thu, December 4, 2025
UDPGangster Backdoor Campaigns Target Turkey, Israel
🔒FortiGuard Labs reports multiple campaigns deploying the UDPGangster UDP-based backdoor, attributed to the MuddyWater espionage group. Attackers used macro-embedded Microsoft Word documents delivered via phishing, impersonating official Turkish emails and targeting users in Turkey, Israel, and Azerbaijan. The malware implements persistence, extensive anti-analysis checks, and UDP C2 communications to exfiltrate data and execute remote commands. Fortinet detections and protections are available to mitigate these threats.
Tue, December 2, 2025
Iran-linked MuddyWater Deploys MuddyViper Against Israel
🔒 ESET reports Iranian-aligned MuddyWater has deployed a previously undocumented backdoor named MuddyViper against Israeli organizations across academia, engineering, local government, manufacturing, technology, transportation, and utilities, as well as one Egyptian technology company. The intrusions began with spear-phishing PDFs and exploitation of VPN and remote-access vulnerabilities to deliver loaders called Fooder, which decrypt and execute the C/C++ backdoor or drop tunneling proxies and browser-data collectors. MuddyViper implements about 20 commands for reconnaissance, file transfer, command execution, and exfiltration of Windows credentials and browser data; several Fooder variants masquerade as the Snake game and use delayed execution to evade detection.
Tue, December 2, 2025
MuddyWater targets Israel with new Fooder and MuddyViper
🛡️ ESET researchers identified a MuddyWater campaign running from 30 September 2024 to 18 March 2025 that primarily targeted organizations in Israel and one confirmed technology victim in Egypt. Operators deployed newly observed custom tools — a reflective loader called Fooder and a C/C++ backdoor named MuddyViper — and abused RMM installers and reverse tunnels. The malware uses Windows CNG for AES-CBC encryption and communicates over HTTPS; operators deliberately minimized hands-on-keyboard activity to hinder detection.
Wed, November 19, 2025
Iranian APTs Used Cyber Espionage to Guide Missile Strikes
🎯 Amazon’s threat intelligence linked Iran-associated APT activity to missile strikes in the Red Sea and Israel, concluding cyber espionage provided direct targeting intelligence. The group known as Imperial Kitten queried AIS ship-tracking data days before a Houthi missile attempt, while MuddyWater gained access to compromised CCTV streams ahead of strikes on Jerusalem. Amazon terms this trend cyber-enabled kinetic targeting and urges maritime, surveillance, and critical infrastructure operators to expand threat models and harden systems that could be repurposed for physical attacks.
Wed, November 19, 2025
Amazon: Nation-State Cyber-Enabled Kinetic Targeting
🔎 Amazon Threat Intelligence reports a rising trend in which nation-state actors use cyber operations to collect real-time intelligence that directly supports physical attacks. The team calls this behavior cyber-enabled kinetic targeting, documenting campaigns that compromised AIS platforms, CCTV feeds, and enterprise systems. Amazon highlights multi-source telemetry and partner collaboration, urging defenders to expand threat models to address digital activities that enable kinetic outcomes.
Wed, October 22, 2025
Iranian MuddyWater Targets 100+ Governments with Phoenix
⚠ State-sponsored Iranian group MuddyWater deployed version 4 of the Phoenix backdoor against more than 100 government and diplomatic entities across the Middle East and North Africa. The campaign began on August 19 with phishing sent from a NordVPN-compromised account and used malicious Word macros to drop a FakeUpdate loader that writes C:\ProgramData\sysprocupdate.exe. Researchers observed Phoenix v4 using AES-encrypted embedded payloads, COM-based persistence, WinHTTP C2 communications and an accompanying Chrome infostealer, while server-side C2 was taken offline on August 24, suggesting a shift in operational tooling.
Wed, October 22, 2025
Iran-Linked MuddyWater Targets 100+ Organisations Globally
🔒 Group-IB links a broad espionage campaign to Iran-aligned MuddyWater that leveraged a compromised email account accessed via NordVPN to send convincing phishing messages. The actor distributed weaponized Microsoft Word documents that coax recipients to enable macros, which execute VBA droppers that write and decode a FakeUpdate loader. FakeUpdate installs an AES-encrypted payload that launches the Phoenix v4 backdoor. Targets exceeded 100 organisations across the MENA region, predominantly diplomatic and government entities.
Wed, October 22, 2025
MuddyWater Exploits Compromised Mailboxes in Global Phishing
🔒 Researchers have uncovered a global phishing campaign that used compromised mailboxes to deliver malicious Microsoft Word attachments, attributed with high confidence to the Iran-linked actor MuddyWater by Group-IB. The operation abused a NordVPN-accessed mailbox to send trusted-looking messages that prompted users to enable macros, which then installed the Phoenix v4 backdoor. Investigators also found RMM tools (PDQ, Action1, ScreenConnect) and a Chromium_Stealer credential stealer, while infrastructure traced to the domain screenai[.]online and an IP tied to NameCheap-hosted services.