All news with #passkeys tag

🔐 Three research teams disclosed attacks that bypass passkey protections without breaking FIDO cryptography. SpecterOps showed Windows-exposed signatures chained through Microsoft Entra ID to impersonate privileged users. Unit 42 demonstrated methods to recover synced passkey private keys in Chrome's Google Password Manager, and Dirk-jan Mollema showed malware in a signed-in Windows session could use a Windows Hello for Business key without a fresh PIN. Vendors issued patches and mitigations with differing impacts.

🔒 A Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 report details how attackers can exploit onboarding, recovery and device-trust workflows to bypass passkey protections after compromising an endpoint. Analysts stress the underlying cryptography remains intact but warn implementations, synced passkeys and support processes create practical risks. Experts advise enforcing user verification, preferring device-bound authenticators and improving incident response.

🔒 A Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 report details how malware on compromised endpoints can abuse onboarding, recovery and device-trust workflows to defeat passkey protections. The research outlines three attack categories—Pass-ta-key, Silver Pass-ta-key and Golden Pass-ta-key—that enable account takeover or mass extraction of synced passkeys. Experts emphasize these are post-compromise attacks that exploit implementation and procedural weaknesses rather than breaking the underlying cryptography. CISOs are advised to enforce user verification, prefer device-bound authenticators for sensitive accounts and tighten enrollment, recovery and sync policies.

🔒 Security researchers from Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 disclosed three related attacks, collectively dubbed "Pass-ta-key," that let malware on compromised Windows devices abuse Google Password Manager's synced passkeys in Chrome on TPM-equipped machines. The techniques — Pass-ta-key, Silver Pass-ta-key, and Golden Pass-ta-key — exploit weaknesses in device trust, onboarding, recovery, and synced credential handling rather than breaking passkey cryptography. While the attacks require existing malware on the victim's device, they can bypass or subvert user verification and even extract the master key that encrypts synced passkeys, enabling account takeover and future key decryption. Unit 42 reported findings to Google and affected services; some issues, such as eBay's validation, have been fixed.

🔒 Unit 42 describes three post-compromise attacks against Chrome's Google Password Manager cloud authenticator—Pass-ta-key, Silver Pass-ta-key and Golden Pass-ta-key—that let malware on Windows obtain valid authentication assertions or extract the master secret without user interaction. The techniques exploit how Chrome stores and reloads TPM-wrapped keys, allows deferred user-verification key creation during re-enrollment, and exposes the 32-byte Security Domain Secret (SDS) in process memory. The research is limited to Windows with TPM and starts from a compromised endpoint; it does not claim cryptographic failure and has no CVEs listed as of August 3, 2026.

🔒 This Unit 42 analysis examines novel attack classes against passwordless authentication, focusing on Google’s synced passkey ecosystem and the Cloud Authenticator used by desktop clients. The research demonstrates how malware on a compromised endpoint can misuse onboarding, recovery and device trust workflows to authenticate without user interaction, bypass user verification, and extract synced passkey private keys. The article outlines three attack variants—Pass-ta-key, Silver Pass-ta-key, and Golden Pass-ta-key—showing practical exploit paths on Windows Chrome with TPM-equipped devices and emphasizing mitigation via Palo Alto Networks products.

🔎 Microsoft reports that disruption of the Tycoon2FA phishing-as-a-service platform drove a sharp decline in traditional phishing techniques, with platform-linked volume falling 92% from pre-takedown averages. The takedown reduced QR code and CAPTCHA-gated phishing and forced attackers to adapt, shifting to channels like Microsoft Teams and automated BEC campaigns. Microsoft recommends stronger email filtering and phishing-resistant authentication such as passkeys, FIDO keys, and multifactor protections to mitigate evolving threats.

🔐 Microsoft will make passkeys the default authentication method for Entra ID starting September 2026, automatically enabling them for users currently relying on SMS and voice MFA. Those phone-based methods will be retired as native Entra capabilities on February 1, 2027, though organizations can use third-party telecom providers if needed. Users already on phishing-resistant methods like Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2 keys, or smart cards can continue using them without change.

🔒 Microsoft Entra ID will begin rolling out passkeys as the default phishing-resistant authentication method starting September 1, 2026. Users currently using SMS or voice for MFA will be auto-enabled for passkeys and prompted to register on their next sign-in. Microsoft will retire native SMS and voice delivery on February 1, 2027, after which telecom partners via the Microsoft Security Store will be required for those methods.

🔔 A threat actor is using voice-based fake security calls to trick Microsoft 365 users into enrolling a malicious Entra passkey. The attacker directs victims to realistic phishing pages that mimic the Microsoft enrollment flow and uses an operator-controlled PHP kit to capture credentials and MFA responses in real time. Okta attributes the campaign to O-UNC-066, linked to the extortion group Pink, which targets multiple industries and quickly exfiltrates data after account takeover.

📧 Email accounts act as hubs for identity verification, password resets and long-term records, making them prime targets for cybercriminals. Attackers use phishing, account takeover, forwarding rules and abused tokens to maintain access, intercept codes and harvest sensitive information. Corporate inbox breaches can lead to data theft, ransomware or expensive fraud, while sophisticated tools like GenAI increase phishing success rates. Regularly review security settings, use MFA or passkeys, and remain vigilant to reduce risk.

🔐 Microsoft marks World Passkey Day by outlining steps to accelerate passkey adoption and reduce reliance on passwords and phishable methods. The company highlights work with the FIDO Alliance, expanded Microsoft Entra passkey support, Windows Hello device‑bound keys, and syncing through Microsoft Password Manager. It also strengthens account recovery with verified ID and biometric checks and plans to remove security questions in Entra ID by January 2027. Organizations are urged to enable passkeys and apply policies across sign‑in and recovery.

🔐 Google outlines five practical tools to make Google Account sign‑ins simpler and more secure on World Password Day 2026. Highlights include Passkeys (device-based sign-in using fingerprint, face, or PIN), recommended pairing with 2-Step Verification, and the ability to add up to 10 Recovery Contacts for account recovery. The post also promotes Sign in with Google to reduce password proliferation and Google Password Manager to create, save, sync, and autofill strong passwords and passkeys.

🔐The UK National Cyber Security Centre now recommends offering passkeys as the default authentication option for consumer accounts, saying passwords are "no longer resilient enough" for modern threats. The agency highlights that FIDO2-based passkeys rely on device-bound cryptographic keys and local verification (biometrics or PINs), making them resistant to phishing and credential reuse. Where passkeys are not yet supported it advises using password managers and strong multi-factor verification, and warns organisations to secure account recovery and fallback processes.

🔐 The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) now recommends passkeys as the preferred sign-in method for consumers, advising passwords only when passkeys are unavailable. This follows a year of collaboration with the FIDO Alliance, observed improvements across the passkey ecosystem and successful NHS deployments. The NCSC also urges businesses to adopt passkeys as the default and to use single sign-on (SSO) where possible, with additional business guidance expected.

🔒 This piece presents eight practical, low-cost measures CISOs and security teams can deploy to materially improve enterprise protection. Recommendations emphasize better enforcement of MFA, fuller use of existing tool capabilities, regular tabletop exercises, and adoption of passkeys for high-risk users. The focus is on disciplined execution, configuration, and human risk management rather than large new purchases.

🔐 The IAM market is shifting from traditional login and MFA toward treating identity as a security control plane, driven by demand for phishing-resistant authentication and stronger governance for non-human accounts. Buyers are prioritizing FIDO2/passkeys, biometrics, and controls for service accounts, API keys, and AI agents. Regulatory change, managed services, and vendor consolidation are reshaping architectures and procurement decisions.

🔐 This Unit 42 analysis examines how Google implements synchronized passkeys using a cloud-based authenticator embedded in Chrome and Google Password Manager. The author documents an enclave service (observed connecting to enclave.ua5v[.]com), hidden onboarding flows, and TPM-backed identity and user-verification keys that bind devices and gate access. The post explains the Security Domain Secret, device wrapping keys, the GPM PIN recovery mechanism, and the Noise/WebSocket transport used to protect device-to-cloud communications, emphasizing a novel attack surface in passwordless deployments.

🔐 X is asking users who rely on passkeys or hardware security keys (for example, YubiKeys) to re-enroll their devices for two-factor authentication by November 10 or face account lockout. The requirement stems from X’s migration from the twitter.com domain to x.com, as existing keys are tied to the old domain. Users should visit x.com/settings/account/login_verification/security_keys to disable and then re-add keys; a password confirmation is required. Re-enrolled keys will be associated with the x.com domain and will continue to work after the migration.

🔐 X is asking users who registered passkeys or hardware security keys (for example, YubiKey) as their two-factor authentication method to re-enroll their key by November 10, 2025. The company says current key enrollments are tied to the twitter[.]com domain and must be associated with x[.]com before the legacy domain can be retired. Accounts not re-enrolled will be locked until users re-enroll, choose a different 2FA method, or opt out of 2FA.