All news with #supply chain compromise tag

🐧 Trend Micro researchers revealed a previously undocumented Linux implant named Quasar Linux (QLNX) that targets software developers by compromising development and DevOps environments such as npm, PyPI, GitHub, AWS, Docker, and Kubernetes. QLNX dynamically compiles rootkit and PAM backdoor modules on the host, runs fileless in memory, and employs multiple persistence methods while wiping logs and spoofing process names to remain stealthy. The toolkit includes a 58-command RAT, credential harvesting (SSH keys, cloud configs, and /etc/shadow), kernel eBPF hiding, surveillance, lateral movement, and in-memory injection; Trend Micro provided IoCs but attribution and prevalence remain unclear.

⚠️ ReversingLabs researchers describe an ongoing supply‑chain campaign called PromptMink that manipulates AI coding agents into installing malicious dependencies. Attackers publish bait packages with persuasive READMEs and LLM‑optimized documentation on registries like NPM and PyPI to increase discovery by autonomous agents and developers. The operation, attributed to North Korea’s Famous Chollima, paired legitimate‑looking SDKs with second‑layer packages carrying infostealers, later evolving to compiled Rust add‑ons, SEAs, SSH backdoors, and project exfiltration.

⚠️ DAEMON Tools installers hosted on the official site were trojanized beginning April 8, delivering a backdoor to thousands of systems worldwide. Compromised, digitally signed installers (versions 12.5.0.2421–12.5.0.2434) contained malicious code in binaries such as DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe. The initial payload is an information stealer used to profile victims; select hosts received a lightweight second-stage backdoor capable of executing commands and loading code in memory. In at least one targeted case researchers observed deployment of a more advanced QUIC RAT, and Kaspersky warns the campaign evaded detection for nearly a month.

🛡️ Kaspersky has identified a supply-chain compromise that trojanized installers for DAEMON Tools, distributed from the vendor’s official site and signed with developer certificates. The affected builds (12.5.0.2421–12.5.0.2434) have been backdoored since April 8, 2026, with three core binaries modified to deploy an implant. The implant contacts an observed C2 domain (env-check.daemontools.cc) to receive shell commands that download and execute follow-on payloads, including a .NET collector and a loader/backdoor pair. Kaspersky observed thousands of initial infection attempts worldwide while more advanced payloads were selectively delivered to a small number of targets in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand; AVB Disc Soft has been notified.

⚠️ Kaspersky researchers discovered a large-scale supply chain attack that trojanized DAEMON Tools installers; the malicious executables are signed with a valid AVB Disc Soft digital signature and have been distributed since April 8, 2026. Once installed the malware runs at startup, collects system and network information, and contacts a command-and-control server that can deliver additional payloads. In some cases attackers deployed a backdoor and a more advanced implant, QUIC RAT, capable of in-memory execution and process injection; users should audit systems and use reliable security solutions.

⚠️ ESET reports that the North Korea‑aligned threat group ScarCruft compromised the sqgame[.]net gaming platform in a targeted supply‑chain operation to deploy the BirdCall backdoor to Android and Windows users. The compromise, active since late 2024, trojanized Android APKs for two games and delivered a malicious Windows update DLL that used RokRAT as a loader. BirdCall — an evolution of RokRAT — harvests contacts, SMS, call logs, media, screenshots, keystrokes and ambient audio, and leverages legitimate cloud services for command‑and‑control.

📱 ESET researchers report that North Korean-linked APT37 (ScarCruft) developed an Android variant of the BirdCall backdoor and distributed it through trojanized APKs on the sqgame.net game platform. The Android implant, first seen around October 2024 and produced in at least seven variants, collects contacts, call logs, SMS, device identifiers, location and system metrics, takes periodic screenshots, records audio during evening hours, and exfiltrates targeted files to a C2. The campaign focused on users in the Yanbian region and underscores ScarCruft’s continued use of supply-chain tactics; users are advised to download apps only from official marketplaces and trusted publishers.

🕵️ ESET researchers uncovered a supply‑chain attack by North Korea‑aligned APT ScarCruft that trojanized a Yanbian‑focused gaming platform. The operation used a malicious Windows update to deploy RokRAT and ultimately the sophisticated BirdCall backdoor, while repackaged Android APKs contained a newly identified Android port of BirdCall. The backdoor harvests files, contacts, screenshots and ambient audio for targeted espionage.

⚠️A malicious PyTorch Lightning package (lightning==2.6.3) published to PyPI contained a hidden execution chain that triggers on import and silently spawns a background process. That process downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime (v1.3.13) and runs an 11.4 MB heavily obfuscated payload detected by Microsoft Defender as ShaiWorm. The payload steals .env files, API keys, GitHub tokens, and credentials from Chrome, Firefox, and Brave, and can query cloud APIs; Lightning AI reverted PyPI to 2.6.1 and urges immediate rotation of secrets.

🚨This week’s telemetry shows attackers moving from quick breaches to persistent occupation across SaaS, CI/CD and hosting panels. CVE-2026-41940 in cPanel/WHM and the Linux Copy Fail bug (CVE-2026-31431) are being actively exploited alongside supply-chain compromises that weaponize developer pipelines. Social engineering — including vishing that bypasses MFA — and AI-assisted phishing kits are scaling attacks. Prioritize urgent CVEs, rotate pipeline credentials, and treat sessions and routine pipeline runs as potentially hostile.

🔒 A new supply chain campaign used sleeper Ruby gems and Go modules published by BufferZoneCorp to deploy post-install payloads that harvest credentials and establish persistence. The malicious Ruby packages exfiltrated environment variables, SSH keys, AWS secrets, .npmrc/.netrc files and developer configuration during install. The Go modules tampered with GitHub Actions by installing fake go wrappers, intercepting builds, and adding a hard-coded SSH key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. Users should remove affected packages, rotate exposed credentials, and inspect systems and CI runners for unauthorized SSH entries and outbound connections.

⚠️ A supply chain attack delivered two malicious PyPI releases of PyTorch Lightning (versions 2.6.2 and 2.6.3) published on April 30, 2026; the packages execute automatically on import to harvest credentials. The malicious build hides a _runtime directory with a downloader that fetches the Bun JavaScript runtime and runs an obfuscated 11MB payload that validates GitHub tokens against the api.github[.]com/user endpoint and injects worm-like commits across writable branches. The threat also tampers with local npm packages by adding postinstall hooks, incrementing patch versions, repacking .tgz files, and enabling accidental republishing back to npm. PyPI has quarantined the project; maintainers are investigating, and users should block the affected releases, downgrade to 2.6.1, and rotate any exposed credentials.

🔍 This ThreatsDay bulletin highlights a week of converging risks: Canadian authorities dismantled an SMS blaster operation that spoofed cellular towers, while a malicious npm brandsquat (published as tanstack) exfiltrated local .env files during install. Researchers also flagged networks of browser extensions legally selling browsing and viewing data, the first documented abuse of the Komari admin agent in intrusions, and mass exposure of RDP/VNC servers—underscoring the importance of basic hygiene, credential rotation, and coordinated defensive response.

🛡️ Atos Threat Research Center disclosed in March 2026 a resilient campaign delivering a JavaScript RAT named EtherRAT via SEO-poisoned GitHub facades. The adversary places benign-looking README storefronts that link to hidden repositories hosting malicious MSI installers impersonating common administrative tools used by admins, DevOps, and security analysts. Payloads download Node.js at runtime and use an Ethereum smart contract queried through public RPC endpoints to resolve live C2 addresses, enabling rapid operator-driven server rotation and evasion of classic takedown techniques. Atos provides IoCs, technical analysis, and mitigation advice including blocking public ETH RPC access and enforcing verified tool provenance.

🔒 A supply-chain campaign dubbed "mini Shai-Hulud" infected SAP-related npm packages in late April, inserting install-time malware that harvested developer credentials, GitHub and npm tokens, GitHub Actions secrets, and cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, GCP and Kubernetes. Researchers identified affected packages including mbt@1.2.48 and several @cap-js modules. The malicious releases were later replaced with safe versions.

🔒 Multiple official SAP npm packages were recently compromised in a supply-chain operation that installs a malicious preinstall script during package installation. The script downloads the Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated payload that harvests a wide range of secrets — including npm and GitHub tokens, SSH keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes configs, and CI/CD environment variables — and exfiltrates them to public GitHub repositories. Researchers attribute the campaign with medium confidence to TeamPCP and warn it includes self-propagation logic to modify other packages using stolen credentials.

⚠️ Researchers have uncovered a supply-chain campaign dubbed the "mini Shai-Hulud" that poisoned multiple SAP-related npm packages to install credential-stealing malware during installation. The malicious releases added a preinstall hook that fetched and executed a platform-specific Bun binary, harvesting local credentials, GitHub and npm tokens, CI secrets, and cloud credentials. Analysts from Aikido Security, SafeDep, Socket, StepSecurity and Wiz advise rotating tokens, inspecting workflows, and upgrading to patched releases.

🛡️ Researchers identified an AI-assisted supply-chain campaign that injected malicious code into npm packages — notably @validate-sdk/v2 — after a dependency was introduced by Anthropic's Claude Opus LLM. ReversingLabs named the operation PromptMink and attributed it to DPRK-aligned actor Famous Chollima (aka Shifty Corsair). The tainted packages siphon crypto credentials and secrets through layered transitive dependencies and have evolved into multi-platform RATs and information stealers.

🔍 Researchers at ReversingLabs uncovered a malicious npm dependency, @validate-sdk/v2, that exfiltrated secrets and enabled attackers to access cryptocurrency wallets after being added to an autonomous trading agent in February 2026. The commit is reported to have been co-authored by Claude Opus, and attribution points to the North Korean state-sponsored group Famous Chollima. The campaign, tracked as PromptMink, used a two-layer package strategy—public-facing Web3 utilities to attract users while secondary dependencies delivered evolving malware that scanned environment files, collected system information, compressed project data, and installed SSH keys for persistence across Linux and Windows environments.

🛡️ Security researchers at Socket uncovered 73 additional fraudulent Open VSX extensions impersonating trusted developer tools; many now include benign code to evade scanners and later fetch a GlassWorm loader. The extensions act as thin loaders, sometimes bundling native binaries, and connect to newly created repositories to download malicious updates. Of the 73, small subsets were activated in staged waves; Socket notified the Eclipse Foundation, and most have been removed.