All news with #web shell tag

🔍 GreyNoise attributes 83% of exploitation attempts against Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) to a single IP hosted on PROSPERO bulletproof infrastructure. Between Feb 1–9, 2026 it recorded 417 sessions from eight source IPs, with 346 sessions from 193.24.123[.]42. Activity targeted CVE-2026-1281 (CVSS 9.8), showed automated tooling patterns and DNS OAST callbacks, and involved rotation through 300+ user-agent strings. Defused Cyber also reported a dormant "/mifs/403.jsp" sleeper shell deployed to some EPMM instances.

🛡️ CrowdStrike's Falcon Linux sensor now offers enhanced visibility and detection for PHP web shells, improving discovery of both pre-existing and obfuscated variants. The On write script file visibility capability captures script content and context as files are written, while Enhance PHP visibility surfaces dynamically evaluated PHP (eval/assert/create_function) as PhpEvalString events. These features have already supported OverWatch in identifying hundreds of web shells and provide richer telemetry for faster investigations and hunting.

🔍 Cisco Talos has uncovered a late-2025 to early-2026 campaign by a China-linked actor tracked as UAT-8099 targeting vulnerable IIS servers across Asia, notably Thailand and Vietnam. The actor uses web shells, PowerShell, and red-team utilities to deploy GotoHTTP and maintain persistence via hidden accounts. Infections deliver the BadIIS SEO-fraud malware family, hijacking crawlers and injecting malicious redirects to manipulate search rankings.

🔍 Cisco Talos has identified a UAT-8099 campaign active from August 2025 through early 2026 that targets vulnerable IIS servers across Asia, concentrating on victims in Thailand and Vietnam. The actor uses web shells, PowerShell, and the GotoHTTP remote-control tool to maintain access and deploy region-customized BadIIS variants that hardcode country codes and inject SEO-fraud content. New persistence mechanisms, hidden accounts, and log-wiping utilities support long-term stealth and evasion.

🛡️ FortiGuard Labs discovered EncystPHP, a sophisticated PHP web shell exploiting FreePBX via CVE-2025-64328. The campaign, linked to activity attributed to INJ3CTOR3, deploys droppers that create root accounts, inject SSH keys, alter cron jobs for persistence, and remove competing shells. Infected hosts enable remote command execution and abuse of PBX telephony resources. Fortinet offers detections and IPS coverage to mitigate the threat.

🔐 A new wave of GoBruteforcer botnet attacks is targeting exposed FTP, MySQL, PostgreSQL and phpMyAdmin services used by cryptocurrency and blockchain projects. Check Point reports the Golang-based botnet brute-forces weak or default credentials—often from servers deployed with AI-generated configuration snippets—and then deploys web shells and downloader stages. The malware scans random public IPv4s, spawning up to 95 threads while skipping private, AWS, and U.S. government ranges. Administrators are advised to remove defaults, audit exposed services, and replace outdated stacks like XAMPP.

🛡️ Check Point Research links a sustained espionage campaign to the China-aligned cluster known as Ink Dragon (also tracked as Jewelbug, CL-STA-0049, Earth Alux/REF7707) that has targeted government and telecommunications organisations across Europe, Asia and Africa since at least March 2023. The actor exploits exposed web applications and predictable ASP.NET machine keys to drop web shells and install a custom ShadowPad IIS Listener, turning compromised servers into resilient C2 relays. Operators deploy a modular backdoor FINALDRAFT (aka Squidoor), alongside NANOREMOTE, loaders and tooling such as VARGEIT and Cobalt Strike to enable stealthy lateral movement, credential theft and high-throughput exfiltration.

🔒 Threat actors are exploiting a command injection vulnerability in Array Networks ArrayOS AG VPN appliances to plant PHP webshells and create rogue user accounts. The flaw affects ArrayOS AG 9.4.5.8 and earlier when the DesktopDirect feature is enabled; Array issued a May update (9.4.5.9) to address the issue. Japan's CERT (JPCERT/CC) reports attacks since at least August originating from IP 194.233.100[.]138. If immediate patching is not possible, disable DesktopDirect or block URLs containing a semicolon as a temporary mitigation.

🔍 Huntress observed the return of GootLoader infections beginning October 27, 2025, with two cases leading to hands-on keyboard intrusions and domain controller compromise within 17 hours. The loader now embeds a custom WOFF2 font using Z85 encoding to substitute glyphs and render obfuscated filenames readable only in the victim browser. Actors deliver XOR-encrypted ZIPs via compromised WordPress comment endpoints and SEO-poisoned search results, and the archive is crafted to appear as benign text to many automated analysis tools while extracting a JavaScript payload on Windows.

🔍 Symantec and Carbon Black attributed a mid‑April 2025 intrusion to a China-linked threat cluster that targeted a U.S. nonprofit engaged in influencing policy, using mass scanning and multiple legacy exploits (including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2017-9805, and Atlassian flaws) to gain initial access. The intruders established stealthy persistence via scheduled tasks that invoked legitimate binaries (msbuild.exe, csc.exe), injected code to reach a C2 at 38.180.83[.]166, and sideloaded a DLL through a Vipre component to run an in-memory RAT. Researchers linked the loader to China-aligned clusters such as Salt Typhoon and warned of broader reuse of legacy vulnerabilities and IIS/ASP.NET misconfigurations for long-term backdoors.

🔴 Symantec and Carbon Black reported a Russian-origin campaign that targeted a large business services firm and a local government entity in Ukraine, relying on web shells and living-off-the-land techniques to reduce detection. Early activity began on June 27, 2025 with deployment of the LocalOlive web shell, PowerShell exclusions, scheduled memory dumps and credential-theft attempts. Operators used dual-use tools (OpenSSH, RDP changes, winbox64.exe), PowerShell backdoors and native Windows utilities to maintain persistence while minimizing custom malware use. Researchers noted strong Windows tradecraft but could not conclusively attribute the intrusions to a named Russian group.

🔒 Researchers at ReliaQuest found China-linked APT Flax Typhoon modified an ArcGIS Server Object Extension (SOE) into a persistent web shell that executed base64-encoded commands via standard ArcGIS operations. The actor used a hardcoded key, staged tools in a hidden C:\Windows\System32\Bridge directory, and renamed a SoftEther VPN binary to bridge.exe to maintain covert connectivity. The malicious SOE was replicated into backups and golden images, allowing access to survive system recovery while attackers performed discovery, credential harvesting, lateral movement, and covert VPN-based persistence.

🔒 Researchers say a Chinese state-linked actor, likely Flax Typhoon, exploited a component of the ArcGIS geo-mapping platform to maintain undetected access for over a year. Using valid admin credentials, the attackers uploaded a malicious Java SOE that acted as a web shell, accepting base64-encoded commands via a REST parameter protected by a hardcoded secret. They then installed SoftEther VPN as a Windows service to create an outbound HTTPS tunnel to 172.86.113[.]142 on port 443, enabling persistent lateral movement and credential harvesting even if the SOE were removed.

🔐 ReliaQuest linked the campaign to the Flax Typhoon APT, which converted a legitimate public-facing ArcGIS Java server object extension (SOE) into a stealthy web shell. The group activated the SOE through a standard ArcGIS REST extension, embedding a base64-encoded payload and a hardcoded key to trigger command execution while hiding activity behind normal portal operations. Attackers uploaded a renamed SoftEther VPN binary to preserve access and targeted IT workstations, and the SOE was later found in backups, enabling persistence after remediation. ReliaQuest warns organisations to go beyond IOC detection, proactively hunt for anomalous behaviour in trusted tools, and treat every public-facing application as a high-risk asset.

🔒 Security researchers warn of an active campaign that modifies WordPress theme files (notably functions.php) to inject malicious JavaScript that redirects visitors to fraudulent verification and malware distribution pages. The injected loader uses obfuscated references to advertising services but posts to a controller domain that serves a remote script from porsasystem[.]com and an iframe mimicking Cloudflare assets. The activity has ties to the Kongtuke traffic distribution system and highlights the need to patch themes, enforce strong credentials, and scan for persistent backdoors.

🔍 UAT-8099, a Chinese-speaking cybercrime group, has been linked to a global SEO fraud operation that targets Microsoft IIS servers to manipulate search rankings and harvest high-value data. The actor gains access via vulnerable or misconfigured file upload features, deploys web shells and privilege escalation to enable RDP, then uses Cobalt Strike and a modified BadIIS module to serve malicious content when requests mimic Googlebot. Infections have been observed across India, Thailand, Vietnam, Canada, and Brazil, affecting universities, telecoms and technology firms and focusing on mobile users.

🔍 Cisco Talos warns a Chinese‑speaking threat group tracked as UAT-8099 is actively compromising misconfigured Microsoft IIS servers to run SEO fraud and harvest high-value data. The actors favor high-reputation domains in universities, technology firms, and telecom providers across India, Thailand, Vietnam, Canada and Brazil to reduce detection. They exploit unrestricted file uploads to install web shells, escalate a guest account to admin, enable RDP and deploy the BadIIS SEO malware, then persist with hidden accounts and VPN/backdoor tools. Talos has published indicators and mitigation guidance, including blocking script execution in upload folders, disabling RDP and enabling MFA.

🔍 A Chinese-speaking cybercrime group tracked as UAT-8099 is hijacking trusted Microsoft IIS servers worldwide to run SEO scams that redirect users to unauthorized adverts and illegal gambling sites. According to Cisco Talos, attackers exploit server vulnerabilities, upload web shells, and conduct reconnaissance before enabling the guest account, escalating privileges and activating RDP. For persistence they deploy SoftEther VPN, EasyTier and the FRP reverse proxy and install the BadIIS malware variants designed to evade detection.

🔐 Cisco Talos recently disclosed activity by a Chinese-speaking cybercrime group tracked as UAT-8099 that compromises legitimate Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers across several countries. The actors use automation, custom malware and persistence techniques to manipulate search results for profit and to exfiltrate sensitive data such as credentials and certificates. Talos notes the group maintains long-term access and actively protects compromised hosts from rival attackers. Organizations should hunt for signs of BadIIS, unauthorized web shells and anomalous RDP/VPN activity and share IOCs promptly.

🔍 Cisco Talos details UAT-8099, a Chinese-speaking cybercrime group that compromises reputable IIS servers to conduct SEO fraud and steal high-value credentials, certificates and configuration files. The actors exploit file-upload weaknesses to deploy ASP.NET web shells, enable RDP, create hidden administrative accounts and install VPN/reverse-proxy tools for persistence. They automate operations with custom scripts, deploy Cobalt Strike via DLL sideloading and install multiple BadIIS variants to manipulate search rankings and redirect mobile users to ads or gambling sites. Talos published IoCs, Snort/ClamAV signatures and mitigation guidance.