All news with #oauth misconfiguration tag

🔒 Curity announced Access Intelligence, an extension to its Identity Server IAM platform designed to secure rapidly proliferating autonomous AI agents. Rather than rely on static, pre-granted permissions, the company uses Token Intelligence to embed an agent's declared purpose and intent in OAuth tokens and issues short-lived, action-specific tokens at runtime. The system can require human approval for high-risk tasks, is deployed as a self-hosted microservice, and centralizes token validation to isolate unregistered or shadow agents.

🔐 Cloudflare is launching Managed OAuth for Cloudflare Access in open beta, enabling agents that speak OAuth 2.0 to authenticate to internal apps with a single click. When enabled, Access acts as the authorization server and uses the www-authenticate header to point agents to the /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server. Agents can dynamically register (RFC 7591), perform PKCE (RFC 7636), and receive JWTs to act on behalf of users, removing the need for static service accounts.

⚠️ Researchers at Imperva disclosed a configuration weakness in the OAuth credential handling of n8n that fails to sanitize the authorization URL, enabling a stored XSS payload to be saved in the application database. An attacker with access to a victim's n8n instance can replace a legitimate URL with malicious JavaScript that executes when other users interact with the same credential. Because the payload is persistent, it can expose multiple OAuth credentials and enable broader system compromise. The flaw was fixed in n8n v2.6.4 on February 6.

🔒 Microsoft warned on Mar 3, 2026 of phishing campaigns that leverage OAuth redirect URLs to bypass email and browser defenses and deliver malware to government and public-sector targets without directly stealing tokens. Attackers register malicious applications and manipulate identity providers like Entra ID and Google Workspace to craft redirect links sent in emails or embedded in PDFs. The delivery chain uses ZIP -> LNK-triggered PowerShell -> MSI -> DLL sideloading to execute in-memory payloads and contact external C2; some campaigns also used AitM kits such as EvilProxy. Microsoft removed identified malicious apps and recommends limiting consent, auditing app permissions, and removing unused or overprivileged applications.

🔒Microsoft Defender researchers observed phishing campaigns that abused OAuth redirection mechanics to route victims from trusted identity domains to attacker-controlled hosts. Attackers used silent authorization requests (for example prompt=none and intentionally invalid scopes) and embedded target addresses in the state parameter to trigger error redirects that landed users on malicious pages or download hosts without yielding tokens. Microsoft flagged correlated activity across email, identity, and endpoints; Microsoft Entra disabled the identified applications, though related activity persists and requires continued monitoring.

🔐 Researchers at KnowBe4 discovered a campaign aimed at North American businesses that tricks employees into entering a “Secure Authorization” code on a legitimate Microsoft 365 login page. Unknown to victims, the code actually authorizes an attacker-controlled device through the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant, issuing access and refresh tokens that grant persistent access to Outlook, Teams, OneDrive and other services. Recommended mitigations include allowlisting OAuth apps, disabling device-code flow in Entra conditional access where feasible, auditing integrations, and ongoing employee awareness training.

🔒 Security teams at fast-growing companies must secure collaboration platforms without slowing the business. This piece highlights common native gaps in Google Workspace—from BEC and targeted phishing to legacy protocol exposure and weak OAuth controls—and lists immediate hardening steps for Gmail, access, and data protection. It also outlines how Material augments Workspace with advanced email defense, context-aware account monitoring, and automated data protection.

🔒 Security firm Proofpoint reports attackers are abusing the OAuth 2.0 device-code flow to bypass MFA. Scammers trick users into entering one-time device codes into malicious Microsoft authentication links, allowing the attackers to capture codes and gain full access to the victim's Microsoft 365 accounts and content. Proofpoint observed both Russian and Chinese threat actors using this technique.

🔒 Within the past year AI copilots and agents have been embedded across major SaaS like Zoom, Slack, Microsoft 365, Salesforce, and ServiceNow, creating dynamic cross-app data flows that traditional governance struggles to monitor. A dynamic AI-SaaS security layer functions as an adaptive guardrail over OAuth grants and integrations, logging prompts and file access, detecting permission drift in real time, and blocking risky actions. Platforms such as Reco aim to deliver continuous visibility, end-to-end auditability, and automated policy enforcement so organizations can adopt copilots without losing control.

🔒 A new variant of the ClickFix social‑engineering technique, called ConsentFix, abuses the Azure CLI OAuth flow to hijack Microsoft accounts without passwords or MFA. Discovered by Push Security, the campaign lures targets via compromised high‑ranking websites and a fake Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA to filter victims. The attack captures an OAuth authorization code returned to a localhost redirect and instructs the user to paste the URL, enabling the attacker to exchange the code for an Azure CLI access token and take control of the account.

🔐 Amazon Web Services added JWT Verification to the Application Load Balancer (ALB), enabling ALB to validate token signatures, expirations, and claims in request headers. The capability supports OAuth 2.0 flows including Client Credentials, letting teams offload M2M/S2S token validation to the ALB without changing application code. The feature is available in all ALB-supported AWS Regions.

🔐 Matt Kiely of Huntress examines how the OAuth 2.0 device code flow enables phishing and highlights stark differences between Microsoft and Google. He walks through the device-code attack chain — generating a device code, social-engineering a user to enter it on a legitimate site, and polling the token endpoint to harvest access and refresh tokens. The analysis shows Azure’s implementation lets attackers control client_id and resource parameters to obtain powerful tokens, while Google’s implementation restricts device-code scopes and requires app controls that significantly limit abuse. Practical examples, cURL/Python snippets, and mitigation advice are included for defenders.

🔐 Amazon Cognito now accepts resource indicators in OAuth 2.0 access token requests, enabling app clients to request tokens targeted to a specific protected resource rather than a broad service audience. After authenticating the client, Cognito issues an access token with the aud claim set to that resource. This replaces prior workarounds that relied on non‑standard claims or custom scopes and simplifies issuing resource‑specific tokens for agents and other clients. The capability is available to Cognito Managed Login customers on Essentials and Plus tiers in Regions where Cognito is offered, including AWS GovCloud (US).

🔒 This ThreatsDay bulletin highlights a series of recent incidents where attackers favored the easiest paths in: tricking users, abusing trusted services, and exploiting stale or misconfigured components. Notable items include a malicious npm package with a post-install backdoor, a CA$176M FINTRAC penalty for missed crypto reporting, session hijacking via MCP (CVE-2025-6515), and OAuth-based persistent backdoors. Practical defenses emphasized are rapid patching, disabling risky install hooks, auditing OAuth apps and advertisers, and hardening agent and deserialization boundaries.

🛡️ At Dreamforce, Salesforce emphasized shared responsibility for securing customer environments and introduced new AI agents for security and privacy. The conference largely avoided discussion of recent OAuth-based supply-chain breaches that exposed data from hundreds of companies and led to extensive litigation. Analysts warn the incidents — driven by compromised tokens from third-party apps like Salesloft Drift and spoofed tools such as malicious Data Loader instances — underscore systemic risks as AI integrations demand broader data access. Recommended mitigations include IP whitelisting, DPoP or mTLS, and tighter vendor governance.

🔐 The SalesLoft acquisition of Drift exposed a hidden fourth‑party attack surface when legacy OAuth tokens—some dormant for 18 months—were abused to access customer Salesforce instances and a limited number of Google Workspace accounts. Attackers leveraged inherited tokens to enumerate and exfiltrate data, revealing how M&A can transfer persistent permissions outside visibility. The author calls for continuous, behavior‑based monitoring of every OAuth token and API call and recommends practical "OAuth archaeology" to inventory, rotate, or revoke legacy access.

⚠️ Zscaler says threat actors accessed its Salesforce instance after a compromise of Salesloft Drift, during which OAuth and refresh tokens were stolen and used to access customer records. Exposed information includes names, business email addresses, job titles, phone numbers, regional details, product licensing and commercial data, and content from certain support cases. Zscaler emphasizes the breach was limited to its Salesforce environment—not its products, services, or infrastructure—and reports no detected misuse so far. The company has revoked Drift integrations, rotated API tokens, tightened customer authentication for support, and is investigating.