All news with #salesforce tag

🔐 The Cloud Security Alliance has published the SaaS Security Capability Framework (SSCF) to establish technical minimum requirements that help SaaS providers and customers apply Zero-Trust principles and address rising third-party risks highlighted by recent Salesforce attacks. The SSCF defines controls across six domains, including identity and access management, data lifecycle, and logging and monitoring, and translates business requirements into concrete, configurable security functions such as log forwarding, SSO enforcement and incident notification. CSA positions the SSCF as a complement to, not a replacement for, frameworks like ISO 27001, while vendors stress that continuous validation and operational implementation are essential to reduce real-world risk.

⚠️ Researchers at Noma Security disclosed a critical 9.4-severity vulnerability called ForcedLeak that affected Salesforce's AI agent platform AgentForce. The chain used indirect prompt injection via Web-to-Lead form fields to hide malicious instructions within CRM data, enabling potential theft of contact records and pipeline details. Salesforce has patched the issue by enforcing Trusted URLs and reclaiming an expired domain used in the attack proof-of-concept. Organizations are advised to apply updates, audit lead data for suspicious entries, and strengthen real-time prompt-injection detection and tool-calling guardrails.

⚠️ Salesforce has released patches for a critical prompt-injection vulnerability dubbed ForcedLeak that could allow exfiltration of CRM data from Agentforce. Discovered and reported by Noma Security on July 28, 2025 and assigned a CVSS score of 9.4, the flaw affects instances using Web-to-Lead when input validation and URL controls are lax. Researchers demonstrated a five-step chain that coerces the Description field into executing hidden instructions, queries sensitive lead records, and transmits the results to an attacker-controlled, formerly allowlisted domain. Salesforce has re-secured the expired domain and implemented a Trusted URL allowlist to block untrusted outbound requests and mitigate similar prompt-injection vectors.

🔒 A critical vulnerability in Salesforce Agentforce allowed malicious text placed in Web-to-Lead forms to act as an indirect prompt injection, tricking the AI agent into executing hidden instructions and potentially exfiltrating CRM data. Researchers at Noma Security showed attackers could embed multi-step payloads in a 42,000-character description field and even reuse an expired whitelisted domain as a data channel. Salesforce patched the issue on September 8, 2025, by enforcing Trusted URL allowlists, but experts warn that robust guardrails, input mediation, and ongoing agent inventorying are needed to mitigate similar AI-specific risks.

🔒 Stellantis has confirmed unauthorized access to a third‑party service provider platform that supports its North American customer service operations. The group said affected customer information was potentially exposed but limited to contact details and did not include stored financial or other sensitive data. Stellantis activated incident response protocols, notified authorities and began informing impacted customers while warning them to expect phishing attempts. Security researchers and outlets linked the incident to claims by ShinyHunters and a recent series of Salesforce-related data breaches.

🔒 Stellantis confirmed unauthorized access to a third-party platform supporting its North American customer service operations, and said attackers stole customer contact information. The company stated the compromised system did not contain financial or other sensitive personal data and that it activated incident response procedures and notified authorities. Reports link the incident to a broader wave of Salesforce-related intrusions claimed by ShinyHunters, and customers are being urged to watch for phishing attempts.

🔒 The ShinyHunters extortion group claims they stole approximately 1.5 billion Salesforce records from 760 companies by abusing compromised Salesloft Drift and Drift Email OAuth tokens exposed in a Salesloft GitHub breach. The attackers reportedly accessed Account, Contact, Case, Opportunity, and User tables and searched exfiltrated data for secrets to pivot further. Google/Mandiant and the FBI are tracking the activity as UNC6040/UNC6395, and Salesforce urges customers to enable MFA, enforce least privilege, and manage connected apps carefully.

🔒 CrowdStrike describes how the Falcon platform delivers unified visibility and lifecycle defense across the full AI stack, from GPUs and training data to inference pipelines and SaaS agents. The post highlights integrations with NVIDIA, AWS, Intel, Dell, Meta, and Salesforce to extend protection into infrastructure, data, models, and applications. It also introduces agentic defense via Charlotte AI for autonomous triage and rapid response, and emphasizes governance controls to prevent data leaks and adversarial manipulation.

🔔 The FBI issued a FLASH advisory linking two threat clusters, UNC6040 and UNC6395, to intrusions of corporate Salesforce environments that resulted in data theft and extortion. Early campaigns relied on social engineering and malicious Data Loader OAuth apps to mass-exfiltrate Accounts and Contacts, while later activity used stolen Salesloft/Drift OAuth and refresh tokens to access support cases and harvest secrets. Multiple large enterprises were impacted and the FBI released IOCs to help organizations detect and mitigate compromise.

⚠️ The FBI released IoCs linking two threat clusters, UNC6040 and UNC6395, to a series of data theft and extortion attacks that targeted organizations' Salesforce environments. UNC6395 exploited compromised OAuth tokens tied to the Salesloft Drift app after a March–June 2025 GitHub breach, prompting Salesloft to isolate Drift and take its AI chatbot offline. UNC6040, active since October 2024, used vishing, a modified Data Loader and custom Python scripts to hijack instances and exfiltrate bulk data, while extortion activity has been associated with actors using the ShinyHunters brand.

🔐 The SalesLoft acquisition of Drift exposed a hidden fourth‑party attack surface when legacy OAuth tokens—some dormant for 18 months—were abused to access customer Salesforce instances and a limited number of Google Workspace accounts. Attackers leveraged inherited tokens to enumerate and exfiltrate data, revealing how M&A can transfer persistent permissions outside visibility. The author calls for continuous, behavior‑based monitoring of every OAuth token and API call and recommends practical "OAuth archaeology" to inventory, rotate, or revoke legacy access.

🔒 Recent Unit 42 analysis details ongoing data theft campaigns targeting Salesforce environments, notably a Salesloft Drift supply chain intrusion attributed to UNC6395 that may have started with reconnaissance as early as March 2025. Threat actors claiming links to Muddled Libra and Bling Libra have promoted stolen datasets on Telegram and announced new RaaS ambitions, while some channels were removed by September 5. Unit 42 emphasizes the prominence of social engineering by operatives tied to "The Com," predicts shifts toward data theft extortion and other monetization tactics, and recommends engagement with RH-ISAC, adoption of Salesforce mitigations, and use of Unit 42 incident insights to strengthen people and process defenses.

🔒 Salesloft says attackers first breached its GitHub account in March, enabling the theft of Drift OAuth tokens later abused to access customer systems. The stolen tokens were used in widespread Salesforce data-theft operations disclosed in August, affecting multiple enterprise customers. Salesloft engaged Mandiant, rotated credentials, isolated Drift infrastructure, and restored integrations after validating containment.

🔒 Salesloft says the breach tied to its Drift application began after a threat actor compromised its GitHub account. Google-owned Mandiant traced the actor, tracked as UNC6395, accessing the account from March through June 2025 and downloading repository content, adding a guest user and establishing workflows. Attackers then accessed Drift's AWS environment and obtained OAuth tokens used to reach customer data via integrations, prompting Salesloft to isolate Drift infrastructure and take the application offline on September 5, 2025. Salesloft recommends revoking API keys for third-party apps integrated with Drift, and Salesforce has restored most Salesloft integrations while keeping Drift disabled pending further remediation.

🔒 Salesloft has moved to take Drift offline after a supply‑chain compromise that resulted in the mass theft of OAuth tokens and unauthorized access to Salesforce data. Multiple large vendors — including Cloudflare, Google Workspace, PagerDuty, Palo Alto Networks, and Tenable — confirmed impact, and activity is attributed to clusters tracked as UNC6395 and GRUB1. The incident underscores how fragile integrations can be and the importance of token hygiene, rapid revocation, and enhanced monitoring to contain downstream exposure.

🔒 Workiva notified customers that attackers who accessed a third-party CRM exfiltrated a limited set of business contact data, including names, email addresses, phone numbers, and support ticket content. The company said the Workiva platform and any data within it were not accessed or compromised. Workiva warned customers to remain vigilant for spear‑phishing and reiterated it will not request passwords by text or phone. BleepingComputer reported the incident is tied to recent Salesforce breaches attributed to the ShinyHunters group.

🔒 Cloudflare and Palo Alto Networks disclosed that threat actors accessed their Salesforce tenants via the third‑party Salesloft Drift app after compromising OAuth tokens. Cloudflare reported reconnaissance on 9 August 2025 and said data was exfiltrated from Salesforce case objects between 12–17 August 2025. The exposed fields principally contained support case text and business contact information; Cloudflare identified 104 API tokens and has rotated them, urging customers to rotate any credentials shared in cases. Google’s Threat Intelligence Group links the activity to UNC6395 and warns harvested data may be used for targeted follow‑on attacks.

🔒 Salesloft said it will temporarily take its Drift chatbot service offline after a supply-chain compromise led to the mass theft of OAuth and refresh tokens tied to the Drift AI chat agent. The outage is intended to allow a comprehensive security review and build additional resiliency; Drift chatbot functionality and access will be unavailable during the process. Salesloft is working with cybersecurity partners Mandiant and Coalition while investigators, including Google Threat Intelligence Group, attribute the campaign to UNC6395 and report that more than 700 organizations may be affected.

🔒 Cloudflare disclosed attackers accessed a Salesforce instance used for internal customer case management in a broader Salesloft Drift supply‑chain breach, exposing 104 Cloudflare API tokens and the text contents of support case objects. Cloudflare was notified on August 23, rotated all exfiltrated platform-issued tokens, and began notifying impacted customers on September 2. The company said only text fields were stolen — subject lines, case bodies and contact details — but warned customers that any credentials shared via support tickets should be considered compromised and rotated immediately.

🔒 Cloudflare confirmed that it and some customers were impacted by the Salesloft/Drift breach which exposed Salesforce support case text. The company found 104 Cloudflare API tokens in the exfiltrated data, rotated them, and observed no suspicious activity tied to those tokens. No Cloudflare infrastructure was compromised; affected customers were notified and advised to rotate any credentials shared in support tickets and to harden third-party integrations.